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Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated,
and Affectionate History of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies
John Henry Schlegel*
When asked to write a history of the post-war years at Columbia
as part of a proposed, but unexecuted, memorial to Herman Oli-
phant, Underhill Moore politely declined with the following
observation:
If the history of the Columbia Law School of the 20's were written
as a political analysis of a microcosm and if the personalities were
snappily sketched, the history would be fun to write but not to have
read. Such a history would have to be the work of a very old man
in retirement, and then the manuscript would have to be deposited
in a safe deposit box.'
I hold no such compunctions, but, at the same time, the notion of my
writing the history of an organization now about seven years old, as I
have been asked to do by this Review, is clearly ridiculous. Not be-
cause I lack perspective; no, that historian's ploy is a polite excuse for
not saying mean-tempered things about living people. But first, be-
cause the notion of history implies a past that is to be recreated, and
this organization effectively has no past; second, because, by virtue of
* B. 1942. B.A. 1964, Northwestern University; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago.
Teaching Fellow 1967-68, Stanford University. Attorney 1968-73, Legal Aid Society of Chi-
cago. Assistant Professor 1973-77, Associate Professor 1977-79, Professor 1979, Associate
Dean 1982, State University of New York, Buffalo. This piece is dedicated to the late Grant
Gilmore who, though he surely disliked the Conference and much of what it stands for,
shared with its members a fierce determination to speak the truth as he saw it without regard
to fad, fashion, or the sensibilities of the audience. I would like to thank Duncan and David
for the time they spent attempting to help me understand their place in the organization of.
the Conference. Alan, Robert, Fred, Janet, Rand, and Mark each in his or her own way tried
to keep me from saying stupid, offensive things. The quality of their advocacy should not be
faulted for their collective lack of success, nor should the resulting product be attributed to
any oversight on their part; these pages reflect only my own pigheadedness.
1. Letter from Underhill Moore to Hessel Yntema (Feb. 24, 1941) (Underhill Moore
Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University).
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previous printed indiscretions,2 I cannot take refuge in that kind of
bland institutional history that can be written about any organiza-
tion at any time; and third, because I refuse to write, nor would the
Conference allow me to write, authorized history of any kind. Thus,
debarred from both serious and trivial scholarship, all I can do is
leave a few footfalls, Lucy-like, should there pass by later a historian
who cares about this movement. What follows is just that, a few
clues that otherwise might be missed that hopefully will illuminate
the formation, problems, and the place in the history of legal educa-
tion of that comparative may-fly of legal organizations-the Confer-
ence on Critical Legal Studies (CCLS).
It is impossible to understand the organization of the CCLS with-
out focusing on the friendship of two individuals-Duncan Ken-
nedy3 and David Trubek.4 Kennedy is a cross between Rasputin and
Billy Graham. Machiavellian, and with a gift for blarney that would
make the stone get up, walk over, and kiss him, he can work an audi-
ence or an individual with the seductiveness of a revivalist preacher,
for Kennedy wants your soul. Trubek, on the other hand, the self-
described leader of the Radical Yale Law School in Exile "Mafia,"5
is more like a cross between Lloyd Cutler and Rabbi Ben Ezra.
Enormously skilled at bureaucratic maneuvering (he has almost sin-
glehandedly kept the soft money heat pump flowing at Wisconsin for
several years now) and a naturally diplomatic conciliator of no mean
talents, he makes and maintains alliances with consummate ease.
One need not, however, defend one's soul against Trubek's on-
slaught; he mostly wants your support.
2. See Konefsky & Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wfa/I." Histories of American Lau, Schools, 95
HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982).
3. B. 1942. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; LL.B. 1970, Yale University. Law Clerk
1970-71, Justice Potter Stewart. Professor, Harvard University. The biographical informa-
tion provided in this footnote and hereinafter has been, for the most part, taken from DIREC-
TORY Of1 LAW TEACHERS, 1982-1983 (1982).
4. B. 1935. B.A. 1957, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1961, Yale University. Law
Clerk 1961-62, Judge Charles Clark; Attorney-Adviser 1962-64, Agency for International
Development; Assistant Professor 1966-67, Associate Professor 1967-73, Yale University; Pro-
fessor 1973, University of Wisconsin.
5. This mystical presence consists of a group of scholars, no longer appropriately de-
scribed as young, all of whom were in one way or another seen as "left," and all of whom were
denied tenure within a few years of each other at Yale. Besides Trbek, the most obvious
mafioso is Richard Abel, now at UCLA and also a CCLS member. The four others who
might or might not object to their inclusion in this group are Lee Albert, now at Buffalo; John
Griffiths, now at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands; Robert Hudec, now at
Cornell; and Larry Simon, now at USC.
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Trubek, who was Kennedy's first-year property teacher, was at
Yale as part of the Law and Modernization program, the last gasp of
law and social science at Yale. Kennedy participated in a Law and
Modernization study group/seminar that Trubek and others organ-
ized and did some work related to the program before dutifully ac-
cepting a Supreme Court clerkship. The two passed quite easily
from student and teacher to just good friends. Each in a sense was
and is an "Enfant"--Kennedy, for his wonderfully jargoned, foul-
tempered Polemic against the Yale Law School;6 Trubek, for his anti-
establishment teaching and scholarship that made him a victim of
the most recent ritual slaughter of the innocents at Yale, the event
that led to the formation of the Mafia.
Debarred, it is said, from seeking a job at Yale because of the
Polemic, Kennedy returned to Cambridge; Trubek left for Madison.
While thus in exile, each undertook a short intellectual journey in
disaffection from Law and Modernization. Trubek's self-estrange-
ment is recorded elsewhere.' He gave up faith in the positive, pro-
gressive role of law in developing countries,' but never gave up faith
in social science; indeed, he turned to Weberian sociology because of
an aversion to Orthodox or "Scientific" Marxism of the "labor the-
ory of value/ownership of the means of production/base determines
the superstructure" variety.9 Kennedy, equally averse to Scientific
6. Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 71
(197Q).
7. Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement." Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and
Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
8. And thus in this country as well, for the concert of foreign travel and domestic conse-
quences is ancient.
9. Here a bit of disjargon, if that is possible, may be helpful to some readers. Since the
twenties, Marxists--that is, individuals whose politics are to the left of liberal and who take as
their starting point for analysis some part or parts of the writings of Karl Marx-may be
broadly, if somewhat unfairly, divided into two groups-the Scientific Marxists and the Criti-
cal Marxists. The Scientific Marxists emphasize the following notions: the labor theory of
value-that the value of a good is determined by the amount of labor utilized in producing it,
and that the capitalist who pays the worker less than the full value of his labor is expropriat-
ing the "surplus"; the determinative importance of the class based ownership of the means of
production; and the determination of the content of political, legal, and other ideas (the su-
perstructure) by the social relations and structures (the base) that follow from ownership of'
the means of production. It is, quite wrongly, associated in the common mind with the fifties'
stereotype of communist thought generated by the "they're all over the State Department/
better dead than red" school.
Critical Marxism draws its name from a group of scholars that included Theodor
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others associated with the Frankfurt Insti-
tute for Social Research. Seegenerally M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION (1973). This
school stresses the indeterminacy of social circumstances, and thus, the impossibility of deriv-
ing intelligible laws of historical change, economic or otherwise. While Critical Marxists do
J'anuary 1984]
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Marxism, began writing madly (his unpublished manuscripts, most
notably on the Hart and Sacks materials, but also on classical legal
thought, are at times all the rage) in what can only be described as
the "Critical" or "Revisionist"' 0 Marxist vein.
The importance of this simultaneous movement for the structure
of CCLS cannot be overemphasized. While the two kept their basi-
cally "left" politics, from a vaguely common intellectual enterprise,
Trubek moved to a position of pessimism while Kennedy gravitated
toward a different kind of explanation of the universe. Thus,
Trubek's sociology emphasized the importance of matters of material
culture for the form and content of law while Kennedy's antisoci-
ology began to stress the radical indeterminacy, and thus the unim-
portance, of material culture as an explanation of law. Kennedy
sought instead to explain the form and content of law by reference to
the internal dynamics of doctrine and to political theories about law.
Thus, the two by themselves created a dynamic that has infected the
organization they spawned, the Conference, from the first. Ironi-
cally, the dynamic is a wonderfully classical pattern of student/child
turning the tables on teacher/parent with the taunt, "'All you taught
me was horse shit, just as I thought!" only to be told in reply, "No,
no, you don't understand."
This reversal of roles-student impatiently instructing teacher
and, in particular, "crazies" (as Kennedy likes to call them) denounc-
ing as meaningless the efforts of empirical social science-not only
has been replayed at every meeting of the group, but is the center-
piece of Kennedy's recounting of the group's formation in 1976-77.
Soon after Kennedy's tenure, as Kennedy tells the story, Trubek, on
a visit to Boston, remarked on the importance of the growing, newly
secured leftist presence at the Harvard Law School and proposed a
meeting between it and the older group of law and social science
advocates. This latter group, of whom Lawrence Friedman," Philip
not deny the labor theory of value, and surely desire a change in the ownership of the means
of production, they deemphasize the importance of these notions for understanding social and
intellectual life. In particular, they reject the distinction between base and superstructure.
Instead, they view alienation, ideology, historical contingency, and the role of human agency
in history together with the relations of production as conceptually separable (though in fact
inseparable) parts of the total sociocultural matrix of capitalism. For further discussion of
this distinction, as well as a fascinating argument that the internecine warfare between these
two groups is a socially determined argument over the primacy of different aspects of the
Marxist canon, see A. GOULDNER, THE Two MARXISNIS (1980).
10. The choice of characterization depends upon one's predilections. To Scientific
Marxists, the enemy is charitably viewed as "Critical," or uncharitably as "revisionist."
11. B. 1930. B.A. 1948,J.D. 1951, LL.M. 1953, University of Chicago. Private Practice
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Selznick,1'2 and Philippe Nonet,'3 were taken to be central represent-
atives, had, through the Law and Society Association and its Journal,
kept flickering the faint candle of law and social science research and
teaching in the law schools for at least twenty years. A self-proclaimed
voice crying out in the wilderness of doctrinal teaching and scholar-
ship, the group was academically left and, to a certain extent, politi-
cally left as well.
The point of hooking up with the law and social science crowd
can be seen both as emphasizing the convergence between the two
groups in their opposition to traditional law school teaching and
scholarship and as beginning a Critical dialogue about the assump-
tions underlying the law on the books, law in action paradigm of the
law and society group. At the same time, of course, Kennedy and his
friends could also draw attention to themselves by saying in effect,
"Hey we made it; there's another leftie on the block. You gotta take
us into account now!"-a not insignificant objective given the poli-
tics of scholarship. This theme-the relationship between two as-
pects of dissident legal scholarship and teaching-can even be seen
in the call for the first meeting, which referred to Kennedy and his
friends as those who are "intellectually indebted. . . [to Trubek and
his law and social science friends] yet have chosen a path quite differ-
ent from that of their teachers."' 4 It may even explain that note of
stridency in some CLS scholarship-a combination of frustration at
the obtuseness of one's elders, a demand to be recognized, and a
slight unsureness about the truth of the matter stated.
The friendship between Kennedy and Trubek has shaped the
group in another way as well. Looking at the list of the Conference's
organizers, one sees that each is tied to one or the other, or to both.
Richard Abel' 5 was a colleague and co-victim with Trubek at Yale,
1955-57, Chicago. Assistant Professor 1957-61, St. Louis University; Associate Professor
1961-65, Professor 1965-68, University of Wisconsin; Professor 1968, Stanford University.
12. B. 1919. B.S.S. 1938, City College of New York; M.A. 1943, Ph.D. 1947, Columbia
University. Instructor of Sociology 1946-47, University of Minnesota; Assistant Professor
1947-52, University of California, Los Angeles; Associate Professor 1952-57, Professor 1957,
University of California, Berkeley.
13. B. 1939. Docteur en droit 1961, Universit6 de Liege, Belgium; Ph.D. 1966, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. Charg& de cours 1966-70, Universit6 de Louvain, Belgium; Assis-
tant Professor of Sociology 1966-71, Associate Professor 1971-77, Professor 1977, University
of California, Berkeley.
14. Letter from Mark Tushnet to Dear Colleague (Jan. 17, 1977).
15. B. 1941. B.A. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University; Ph.D.
1974, University of London. Assistant Professor 1968-70, Associate Professor 1970-74, Yale
University; Professor 1974, University of California, Los Angeles.
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and along with Tom Heller, 16 was a member of the Law and Devel-
opment Study Group there. Rand Rosenblatt17 and Mark Tushnet'8
started as first-year students with Kennedy, who, because the other
two were pursuing joint degrees, ended up their senior editor on the
Law Review. Tushnet, Heller, and Stewart Macaulay 9 were col-
leagues of Trubek's at Wisconsin; Morty Horwitz2" and Roberto Un-
ger2' were colleagues of Kennedy's at Harvard. Similarly incestuous
rings can be drawn to encompass most of the actual participants at
the first meeting in the spring of 1977, where about the most tenuous
connection was being "a friend of a friend" of one or the other.22
Even the destruction of the neat binary form that characterized
the original conception of the organization can be attributed to Ken-
nedy and Trubek. Tushnet was included on the organizing commit-
tee in large measure because, at the time, he was the Associate Dean
at Wisconsin and, as such, had a secretary and easy access to dupli-
cating facilities and other amenities without which organizing a large
meeting is impossible. But Tushnet was then what he is not now-a
relatively orthodox, Scientific Marxist. Thus (somewhat ironically
for Kennedy's social indeterminist position), out of material neces-
sity, a third leftist perspective achieved prominence in the group. It
16. B. 1944. B.A. 1965, Princeton University; LL.B. 1968, Yale University. Fellow
1968-70, International Legal Center, Bogota, Colombia; Fellow in Law and Modernization
1970-71, Yale University. Assistant Professor and Associate Professor 1971-79, University of
Wisconsin; Visiting Associate Professor 1978-79, Professor 1979, Stanford University.
17. B. 1945. B.A. 1966, Harvard University; M.Sc. 1967, London School of Economics
and Politicai Science; J.D. 1971, Yale University. Law Clerk 1971-72, Judge Jack Weinstein;
Staff Attorney 1972-73, Health Law Project, Pennsylvania. Assistant Professor 1973-75,
Rutgers University, Newark; Assistant Professor 1975-76, Associate Professor 1976-82, Profes-
sor 1982, Rutgers University, Camden.
18. B. 1945. B.A. 1967, Harvard University; J.D. 1971, M.A. 1971, Yale University.
Law Clerk 1971-72, Judge George Edwards; Law Clerk 1972-73, Justice Thurgood Marshall.
Assistant Professor 1973-76, Associate Professor 1976-79, Professor 1979-81, University of
Wisconsin; Professor 1981, Georgetown University.
19. B. 1931. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1954, Stanford University. Law Clerk 1955-56, Judge
William Denman. Instructor 1956-57, University of Chicago; Assistant Professor 1957-60,
Associate Professor 1960-65, Professor 1965. University of Wisconsin.
20. B. 1938. A.B. 1959, City College of New York; Ph.D. 1964, LL.B. 1967, Harvard
University. Law Clerk 1967-68, Judge Spottswood Robinson, III. Charles Warren Fellow
1968-70, Assistant Professor 1970-74, Professor 1974, Harvard University.
21. B. 1947. Mr. Unger neither maintains nor circulates a vita. Other information is
thus unavailable.
22. I offer but one example, a personal one. I was invited first as a friend of Al Katz,
with whom I had taught at Buffalo. Katz and Kennedy had become friends as a result of a
visit Kennedy had made to Buffalo, using Trubek's friendship with Marc Galanter as an
entree. I was also invited as an acquaintance of Kennedy, whom I met when he came to
Buffalo.
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is this third perspective, I suspect, that seems to overpower the social
science at the root of the organization, making it appear to those on
the outside to be a Marxist monolith. Yet nothing could be further
from the truth. Indeed, for those on the inside, the addition of this
third perspective has generated a second basic dynamic within the
organization-three-corner catch.
The game goes pretty much as follows. While there are excep-
tions (Rick Abel, for instance) most of the law and social science dis-
sidents who inhabit the Conference have not been heavily influenced
by Scientific Marxism. Indeed, to the extent that they are Weberian,
scholars like Trubek, Marc Galanter23 (for a short while a participant
in the group), or Stewart Macaulay can be seen as anti-Marxist. Be-
cause the kind of thought that Kennedy may be taken to represent
likewise rejects orthodox Marxism, the two groups have, and are able
to mobilize, a common interest in attacking that enemy.
Yet that enemy is not without its own resources. On the one side,
Scientific Marxism has a potential ally in the social scientists, since in
some sense, both explain the world with great emphasis on material
culture. For both of these groups, then, Kennedy and his crazies pro-
vide a common enemy, since in its emphasis on the role of ideas in
determining the content of law, Critical Marxism may be seen as an
attempt to turn Hegel upside down again and thus create a tradi-
tional idealism, not unlike the idealism that is liberal thought. On
the other side, Scientific Marxism has an ally in Critical Marxism,
since, for both tendencies, the evil in the world is capitalism. For
both brands of Marxism, then, empirical social science is a conve-
nient whipping boy, because, as social science, it can be tied to the
long history of apologetics for American society in which the gap
between law in the books and law in action can be viewed merely as
a call to work harder to perfect that society, rather than as a symp-
tom of the deep crisis caused by capitalism and its liberal apologists.
And thus around the room the ball is tossed.24
23. B. 1931. B.A. 1950, M.A. 1954, J.D. 1956, University of Chicago. Bigelow Teach-
ing Fellow 1956-57, University of Chicago. Fulbright Scholar 1957-58, University of Dehli.
Assistant Professor 1958-59, Stanford University; Visiting Assistant Professor 1959-60, Assis-
tant Professor 1960-66, Associate Professor 1966-7 1, University of Chicago; Visiting Professor
1971-72, Professor 1972-77, State University of New York, Buffalo; Visiting Professor
1976-77, Professor 1977, University of Wisconsin.
24. Alternative explanations of the intellectual dynamics of the organization can be
given, and indeed I have previously done so. See Letter from John Henry Schlegel to David
Trubek (June 5, 1977), reptintedin 2 CCLS NEWSLETTER, Summer 1977. CCLS is clearly not
a Marxist monolith, though to some outsiders the predominance of Critical perspectives in
the most visible members of the group might indicate the contrary. David Trubek has re-
January 1984]
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Whether the resulting form of the game stabilizes or destabilizes
the organization may be a question of perspective, but this is basi-
cally unimportant. Within the group and its scholarship, all three
alliances can be seen. Indeed, the classic example comes from the
very first meeting 5 where, at the end of a session, Trubek attempted
to sum up "the problem" with which the group had been grappling
as "whether we are Marxists." He then announced his difficulty with
the labor theory of value and thus his rejection of Scientific Marxism.
Tushnet, unconsciously emphasizing the similarities of his own posi-
tion with Trubek's, retorted that "the question" was not "whether we
are Marxists," but whether, given that ideas can have some influence
on material economic culture, we'believe that "in the last instance" it
is material culture that determines the content of those ideas. Hav-
ing thus been pushed into the role of the opposition, Kennedy and
his friends first responded by denying their allegiance to Scientific
Marxism, calling instead for the "totalization of base and superstruc-
ture"-that is, the treatment of the world of material culture and the
world of ideas as a totality, any piece of which is a representation of
the whole, and neither part of which has an a priori claim to being
determinative of the other part. They then, unconsciously no doubt,
opened the door for the social scientists by stating that "the ques-
tion" was how structures of thought legitimate the existing social or-
der and the domination inherent in it-a vaguely sociological
question, though not one on which quantifiable empirical research
could be done.26 And thus the ball was back where it started, follow-
jected the proposition that the dynamic is a binary one, fluctuating between "subjective,
idealist doctrinalist" and "resigned, objective, behavioralist" perspectives. See D. Trubek,
Slaying Dragons or Creating Them? Preliminary Reactions to the First Conference on Criti-
cal Legal Studies (June 6, 1977) (unpublished manuscript). I think there is more to this
distinction, which is basically that between Critical Marxists and other Marxists, than
Trubek will admit. Such a view of the world reflects the dynamics of actual power in the
group where the Critical perspective is the more prevalent, a fact that leads factions making
up the loyal opposition to emphasize the traditional materialism that they share At the time
of the formation of the group, I argued for a two-by-two table-Marxist/non-Marxist, ideal-
ist/materialist-and for a binary structure-more emphasis on the determination of reality
by the world of ideas/more emphasis on the determination of reality by the world of objects.
See Letter from John Henry Schlegel to David Trubek, supra. Six years later, neither charac-
terization seems to fit the group quite right. What the dynamic will be when the group
attempts to integrate the feminist "rights" perspective in the next few years is anyone's guess.
25. To date, the group has had eight meetings: Madison, spring 1977; Boston, winter
1978 (said to be a regional meeting); Madison, fall 1978; San Francisco, spring 1979; Buflalo,
spring 1980; Minneapolis, spring 1981; Boston, spring 1982; Camden, spring 1983. Clearly,
the shift to annual meetings reflects the dawning understanding that, at least among legal
academics, relatively little "new" work gets done, even in the course of a year.
26. It thus seems to me that Alan Hyde shows a misunderstanding of his subject when
[Vol. 36:391
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ing a dynamic that can be directly attributed to two men, Trubek
and Kennedy, who brought their friends and acquaintances together
to talk about law.
Of course when a group like this is formed, it in some sense al-
ways takes on a life of its own, apart from the wishes of its Founding
Fathers; CCLS is no exception. In spite of their hopes and wishes for
concord, agreement, and the prospect of "a new scholarly commu-
nity," Trubek and Kennedy's design of the group led inexorably to
the already described intellectual conflict, a conflict they feared and
even tried to paper over during and after the very first meeting. 27
Their design led to external conflict as well. Here the fear of con-
flict-social and in some ways intellectual-probably far exceeded its
reality. In any event, the fear dominated the group, or at least the
inner circle, from the outset. The shadow villains were two. The
first, an unnamed, and, I suspect, an unknown, band of doctrinaire
Marxists referred to as "Guild types," brought forth both fears-the
social and the intellectual. It was assumed that, as was the case with
much factional left politics during the late sixties and early seventies,
intellectual disagreements would spill over into social relations, and
clearly a good portion of the group wanted space, both intellectual
and social, for anything but doctrinaire discussion and community
fractionalization. The second, a group of prominent liberals,
brought forth only the fear of intellectual conflict, for it was assumed
that fights about liberalism within the group would inhibit develop-
ment of the group's own distinctive approaches to law.
At the first meeting these two groups were simply excluded. This
strategy became so blatant with respect to the liberals that it led to
an amusing conversation between Kennedy and Dean Harry Wel-
lington of Yale. Dean Wellington first protested that members of his
he suggests that an "agnostic" position be taken on the legitimation function of law because
the social science literature cannot quantitatively verify its independent operation. See Hyde,
The Concept of Legzttmatzon :n the Sociolog, of Lawt, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379. The concept is not
directed at something countable but at a way of thinking about institutions in society. It
would be equally plausible to take an agnostic position on the existence of a feudal world
view because of an inability to verify its independent impact on the actions of serfs.
27. Set, e.g', D. Trubek, supra note 24: Abel, Comments, 2 CCLS NEWSLETTER, Summer
1977.
28. There was also a trace of "small-pondism" in this fear: In the liberal pond, we were
a small chorus of tree frogs; in our own, we are a more audible chorus of bull frogs. And it
should not be forgotten that there was some joy at having an exclusive club of our own, given




faculty, obviously as smart and as "with it" as any around, were be-
ing excluded for no good reason. He then retreated wholly satisfied,
upon being informed that the criterion for extending invitations was
not smarts but politics and that on this criterion the Yale faculty was
not left enough. Ever since the original policy of "by invitation only"
was changed to "open door" at the second, so-called "regional,"
meeting at Northeastern the following fall, traditional liberals have
largely avoided the organization like the plague. But an incident at
that meeting in which a paper by Ike Balbus29 was viciously, if rather
isolatedly, attacked for having nothing to do with "the working
class," seemed for some to suggest that the other exclusion had been
sensible.
These fears, largely unrealistic though they may seem to most of
us now, and to some of us then, given the implicit decision that the
group was to be largely composed of, and directed by, the interests of
the law professoriat, led to the quite astonishing highlight of the sec-
ond Madison meeting in the fall of 1978. True to all the norms of
left gatherings, CCLS ends each conference with a "plenary" session
for feedback, planning, speeches, and making up. However, this ple-
nary session began with a very embarrassed organizing committee
informing the gathering that the heretofore informal group had be-
come a membership organization with its own pledge and bylaws,
and that- an interim executive committee had been selected to run
the organization until a board of directors with staggered terms, just
like a corporate takeover target, could be elected. The silence from
an audience accustomed to a modicum of self-determination in such
matters was deafening, and the committee's defense of its action as
providing for future democracy rang hollow when placed in conjunc-
tion with known, if not shared, fears of left factionalism.
Not only is the group thus given on occasion to the common lib-
eral vice of putting institutions first and individuals second, but it
also suffers from more than a dose of liberal elitism. One can see in
the inclusion of the likes of George Fletcher and Ian McNeil at the
first Madison meeting a need to have "names," which is less obvious
in the inclusion of Roberto Unger on the organizing committee and
in the hagiography of the organization, even though he has done lit-
tle more than attend the first two meetings and deliver a long speech
at a recent one. Less innocuous, though equally understandable, is
29. B. 1944. A.B. 1964, Colby College; Ph.D. 1970, University of Chicago. Assistant
Professor 1969-73, Princeton University; Associate Professor 1973-76, City University of New
York; Associate Professor 1976-83, Professor 1983, University of Illinois, Chicago.
[Vol. 36:391
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the pride of the group in general and the excitement of some of its
members in particular at the establishment of its first "colony" at
such an elite institution as Stanford, rather than at, say, Dayton, Du-
quesne, or Bridgeport. Similarly, the joy shared by the troops at any
"news" suggesting even obliquely that a "fancy" school might be in-
terested in getting a "Critical legal type" to add a touch of the exotic
to its menu is notable, if only to cause wonder at the notion that
demystification-the stripping away of the veneer of apolitical deci-
sionmaking from the legal process-from the top down is a rational
revolutionary strategy, a notion again called to mind every time one
hears of left victories in the glacial march of curriculum and appoint-
ments reform at Langdell Hall. Less pleasant is the feeling, often
expressed by newcomers, that the group is divided between an inner
circle of old timers who dominate the organization and whose ideas
and interests set its tone and direction, and a great unwashed whose
presence is tolerated, but little more, unless introduced by the right
people. This accusation gains some credence from the observation
that it took three years before the organizing committee would open
up "summer camp"-now annual week-long summer sessions de-
voted solely to discussion of selected texts and scholarship-to the
membership generally, and even then only with group leaders care-
fully ensuring that the new guest list looked more than slightly like
the old."0
Exactly what should be concluded about the organization and its
members from all of this is by no means clear. No one could deny
that endless hours have been spent discussing both institutional pro-
tectiveness and elitism in CCLS. And some progress has been made:
Witness the recent decision to open up membership in the organizing
committee to anyone who wishes to join in its deliberations. Further-
more, to complain about either institutional protectiveness or elitism
is both to engage in the reification of democratic forms and to forget
that people will be friends with, and trust the judgment of, those
people whom they know best and longest. In a group that began at,
30. Summer camp began in the summer of 1980 with a meeting in Santa Cruz, jointly
sponsored by the Conference and by Crown College of the University of California at Santa
Cruz, Participants from Santa Cruz included Norman 0. Brown, Richard Wasserstrom, and
Hayden White. Subsequent meetings have been in Andover. I should emphasize that these
meetings have been incredibly important for the intellectual development of some partici-
pants. and not simply an exercise in elite navel gazing. This fact may suggest that more effort
should be put into sponsoring similar small working gatherings and less effort into organizing




and primarily with people from, elite law schools, some, perhaps
much, of what is seen as elitism is nothing more than sticking with
and trusting one's friends. Yet, in an organization that claims to be
as deeply antihierarchical as this one does, behavioral manifestations
of traditional notions such as "wisdom proceeds up river on the
Charles and then out to the countryside," or "getting ahead is teach-
ing at a better law school," are deeply troubling. Such notions abet
nagging doubts in the membership and deeply held suspicions in out-
siders that what the group is about is little more than shifting power
from one elite to another. That is not what the group is about! Yet
old ways, bred in the bone early enough to fit Loyola's boast, die
much harder than grows the rhetoric that denies their existence. Un-
fortunately, this truth has not yet fully reached the left-handed con-
sciousness of the collective dictatorship that runs the organization.
One should not, however, surmise that this informal politburo
has had a profoundly negative impact on the group. In fact, pre-
cisely the opposite is the case. The group as a whole has fostered
within its self-defined borders an incredible tolerance, both social
and intellectual, which allows individuals to make quite silly state-
ments in open meetings, and allows newcomers, at least those who
are a bit aggressive, simultaneously to acquire a supportive yet Criti-
cal forum for ideas and an equally supportive social network. In
such a community, fragmented though it may be, personalities have
grown with the luxuriance of houseplants. No meeting would be
complete without the appearance of Peter Gabel's 3" curly black locks
and earnest, terminally tired eyes, to present, in his own wonderfully
dense and contorted prose, the epicycles of self-alienation as he has
come to understand them in any given year." Nor would I ever miss
the balding, almost elfin, Morty Horwitz, embarrassedly defending
his latest attempt to salvage his limited version of the socioeconomic
31. B. 1947. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1972, Harvard University. Teaching Fellow 1972-74, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; Assistant Professor 1974-75, University of Minnesota. Profes-
sor and Co-President 1975, New College of California School of Law.
32. Peter's verbal style has been captured best by a cartoonist at New College, whose
piece, "Peter Talks to Some Winos" begins:
The central point of everything I have said thus far can be summarized as follows:
the "legal system" is the institutionalization of the effort of alienated consciousness
to maintain its own dominant position by channeling social conflict into authorita-
rian settings and by "resolving" this conflict according to a system of thought that
reinstates the "legitimate necessity" of the status quo.
It is to Peter's credit that he immedidtely circulated this satire on his style among a number of
people. Though the Conference prides itself on its seriousness, unlike most other parts of the
law professoriate, it has the pronounced ability to laugh at itself on occasion. Peter is a classic
example of this healthy human (and humane) trait.
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determinism of legal ideas from the onslaught of his neighbor in
Langdell Hall, Mr. Kennedy. Similarly important are the cleanly
polished sentences and paragraphs, always spiced with just enough
humor to make the medicine go down, delivered in the most care-
fully modulated tones by Robert Gordon,33 words that are inevitably
contrasted with the more direct utterances of that self-proclaimed
"old fogie" where teaching is concerned, the stout Tushnet who, on
occasion, sees fit to remind us that "when they find out what we're
doing, they're going to come after us with guns." Such judgments of
centrality to the experience are, of course, personal and idiosyncratic,
but to build an organization in which the personal and idiosyncratic
can flourish, where the group as a whole can on occasion discuss a
book or idea and not sit ossified as presenters drone on and commen-
tators sit nervously on their witticisms, is an achievement not to be
sneered at.
Setting aside the organizational dimension of CCLS and re-
turning to the intellectual, I would hazard a guess that the reference
to the Frankfurt School of Critical Marxism in the title of the organi-
zation was probably lost on many, if not most, of the participants at
the first meeting,34 the majority of whom had read little of that or
other Critical Marxism beyond the obligatory college volume of Eros
and Civilization or One Dimensional Man. This fact, if such it be, sug-
gests that, to date at least, the CLS movement may be less important
as an event in the history of legal thought, than as an event in the
history of legal education.
One of the most important, though virtually unexamined, aspects
of legal education is its cultural one. At least since Blackstone, and I
suspect long before, the central job of legal education has been to
justify existing rules of law to the nascent members of the legal
elite.35 The task is an important one; no society wants its priests wan-
dering around doing their magic while doubting the one true faith.
Here, then, can be appreciated the importance of "Langdell's" case
method: It moved this act of justification closer to the center of the
student/teacher relationship by turning what was ofttimes, though
33. B. 1941. A.B. 1967. J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Assistant Professor 1971-74.
.Associate Professor 1974-77. State University of New York, Buffalo; Associate Professor
1977-80. Professor 1980. University of Wisconsin, Professor 1982, Stanford University.
34. David Trubek always says that "'Critical" is meant to cover "'anything from Marxist
to querulous."
35. Here, and in much of the balance of this paragraph, I steal shamelessly, and proba-
bly erroneously, from Al Katz.
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not always, a monologue into something more approximating a dia-
logue, from a passive to a vaguely active enterprise.
While the style of this dialogue of justification seems to have
changed over time, as well as within particular eras or even within
particular law schools, its content has remained remarkably stable
for the past one hundred years. In that period, there have been but
two types of content. The first, whatever its claims to evolutionary
historicism, justified the rules because of their logical interrelation-
ship; the rules were right because they fit with the other rules. The
second justified the rules because of their intrinsic social goodness;
the rules were right because they embodied wise social policy. The
first is said to be formalist; the second, more misleadingly, Realist.
But whatever the content of the act of justification, the enterprise is
by nature conservative, not radical. Its overt political content can,
and has, varied from conservative to liberal, and might conceivably
be reactionary or radical, but its basic conservatism remains. In or-
der for all the nascent elite to sleep comfortably, the message must be
positive. It need not be panglossian, but to be effective, the message
cannot be that more than a few rules need fixing in order to get the
system running right. Within this basic intellectual structure oper-
ates the history of legal education since 1870.
For the first fifty years the overt political content of the dialogue
of justification was overwhelmingly conservative, so overwhelmingly
conservative that Roscoe Pound's plea for an improved civil proce-
dure" could indeed be seen as radical, which gained him instant no-
toriety in legal academe. The combination of the death of
progressivism in World War I, the swing to a socially conservative
national government, and the gathering economic dislocation that
by the end of the twenties had become the Depression, brought to the
fore renewed left political activity. In the legal academy this left
politics joined with the twentieth century notion of science as empiri-
cal inquiry into a world "out there" to produce American Legal
Realism.
Politically, Realism was no more than liberal; its content reflected
much of what Mark Tushnet likes to call "the 1964 platform of the
Democratic Party. ' 37 But the importance of its liberalism should not
be underestimated, for as liberals, Realists were substantially to the
left of the academic center, as evidenced by Llewellyn's dispute with
36. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dzisatisfactzon with the Admmnistratton of Justice, 1906
A.B.A. REP. 403.
37. Tushnet, Deviant Science in Constitutional Law, 59 TEx. L. REx'. 815, 815 (1981).
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Pound,38 who was left by law school standards but at best a political
centrist. In contrast, Realism was educationally radical, for it denied
that the rules as they existed were justified. Here again the Realists'
differences with Pound are instructive. The basic thrust of Pound's
position was that if the law in action were made to conform with the
law in the books, all would be fine. But one of the thrusts of Realist
scholarship was to suggest that the law in the books was not fine.
Realism made this assertion in four ways. The first is the most
well known: Claims were made, often building on Hohfeld's work,39
that the rules were simply incoherent. Here, the most notable exam-
ple is Walter Wheeler Cook's work on the conflict of laws.4" The
second is less well known: Claims were made that justification was
inappropriate to scientific inquiry. This strategy underlay all of the
Realists' empirical research, but is most notable in the work of Un-
derhill Moore.4' The third is now a classic: Attempts were made to
simply debunk the process by which the rules were created. Here,
Jerome Frank's work is most notabie.42 And the fourth is the most
unusual, but not unknown, strategy: Rather direct assertions were
made that the rules were simply wrong. Here, Thurman Arnold4 3
and Walton Hamilton44 come to mind.
Given that Realism thus undercut the underlying purpose of le-
gal education-the justification of existing laws-it not too surpris-
ingly created a real flutter in the academy. And that flutter became
downright hostility as the thrust of the Realists' critique of "justifica-
tion through logical interrelationship" became clear to even the most
opaque of humans by the-late thirties. The reason for the hostility is
easy to identify: The Realists' critique highlighted the central ques-
tion that the dialogue of justification is designed to suppress: the
question of power-in whose interest legal rules are made.
After a tangled history, of interest only to aficionados of the thir-
ties and forties, a basic shift in the form and content of the dialogue
took place. Policy analysis of a liberal political stripe became the
38. Llewellyn, A Reahstie Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLL'M. L. REX. 431 (1930);
Pound, The Call/or a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, Some Real-
in About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV'. 1222 (1931).
39. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913).
40. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924).
41. See, e.g., Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUNI. L. REV. 609 (1923).
42. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Frank, Are Judges Hman, 80 U.
PA. L. RE%. 17 (1931).
43. Arnold, CriminalAttempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930).
44. Hamilton, The Ancient 31axim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133 (1931).
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norm, and questions of process were thought to have laid to rest
questions of power. In the meantime, rising academic standards in-
creas'ingly cut off access to legal careers for the lower middle class,
and decreasing course requirements were turning law schools into a
thoroughly incoherent garden of earthly delights.
This stasis was, however, relatively short-lived. By the mid- to
late-sixties, the fallout from student and, with caterpillar-to-butter-
fly-like eventuality, teacher idealism concerning the New Frontier
and the Great Society had begun to reach the law schools. This was
then followed by disillusion and hostility arising from the Vietnam
War, Watergate, and the nation's political shift to the right. Simul-
taneously came student clamor for relevance and clinical education
and the assembly of a small but determined band of social science
types dedicated to showing what was "really" going on out there, the
Law and Society Association.
Meanwhile, inside the classroom, policy analysis was becoming
an increasingly fragile enterprise. This fragility was probably an in-
herent problem, for the usual technique of such analysis-balancing
of interests-transparently invites dissent in the form of "no, this in-
terest is the stronger." With the collapse of "The End of Ideology"
consensus during these years, such dissent vigorously increased both
inside and outside the classroom. The result was that questions of
power were again brought to the fore, if only to be hidden in
embarrassment.
The growing awareness of the fragility of policy analysis made
traditional legal scholarship appear more and more bankrupt in its
attempt to maintain the appearance of neutral disinterestedness
through the ad hocing of interests and the transparent manipulation
of their weight. Even more tellingly, one could clearly discern
among the more elderly members of the teaching fraternity a sense of
general malaise and nostalgia for the "good old days" when stan-
dards were clear so that everyone knew what was good teaching and
fine scholarship.
It is out of this unstable situation that CCLS emerged. Almost all
of the principals of the group came to maturity during the late sixties
or early seventies. Most began teaching during these years as well,
often after a stint in legal services or some other reform-oriented post,
as well as participation in the antiwar movement.4 5 And while
dreams of reform faded, the common politics did not; indeed, many
45. I note with some alarm that a quick review of the biographies strung out in these
footnotes reveals a consistent pattern of progression from fancy law school to fancy clerkship
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of the principals often moved farther left in an attempt to explain
what had gone wrong with earlier great hopes.
The personal odyssey of the principals of CCLS does not have an
obvious Realist analogue; yet the drawing of parallels between these
two intellectual movements separated by nearly fifty years may nev-
ertheless be appropriate, perhaps even illuminating, because of a
shared, relatively left politics, practiced in a relatively conservative
social and political environment. First, while the politics of most of
the CLS group is much left of Realist politics, it, like Realist politics,
is threatening to the dominant elements in legal education less be-
cause of its absolute position on the political spectrum than because
it is left relative to those dominant elements; left is destabilizing.
More important, however, just like Realism, CLS has as one of its
central goals the dejustification of legal rules. Indeed, the movement
uses essentially the same techniques; claims of incoherence or inap-
propriateness abound, as do examples of demythologizing (i.e., de-
bunking or trashing) judicial decisionmaking (and everything else),
and direct denials of the correctness of policy. And the reaction of
horror from the established corners of legal academia, especially lib-
eral academia, is much the same as well.
At the same time, one should note differences between the two
movements, other than purely political ones. While there are excep-
tions in both groups, the social science of choice for Critical scholars
is history, not the heavily quantified sociology that so fascinated the
Realists. Likewise, claims of incoherence are less likely to be seen at
the level of specific doctrines that the Realists loved to work over
than at the level of entire subject areas of law- contracts,46 labor,4 7
civil rights, 48 etc. Furthermore, concern with the specific proposals
for law reform that often lay just beneath the surface of Realist schol-
arship is conspicuously absent from much of present Critical scholar-
ship. On the other hand, Realist scholarship largely lacked the
explicit concern for social theory that abounds in Critical scholar-
and back to fancy law school. I trust that this is but another example of data obscuring the
facts, though it also occurs to me that this may be a point for the antimaterialist position.
46. See Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Methodfor Critical
Legal Theooy, 61 MINN. L. REX. 601 (1977); Mensch, Book Review. 33 STAN. L. REV. 753
(1981).
47. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983);
Klare,Judiczal Deradicalization of the It 'agner Act and the Origins of the Aodern Legal Consciousness,
1937-19,1, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Stone, The Post- War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE LJ. 1509 (1981).
48. See Freeman, Legitimizi'g Racial Discrimination Through Antidiserimination Law: A Criti-
cal Reriew of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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ship. And while both movements share a concern with legal educa-
tion, it remains to be seen whether Critical scholars can transform
the face of legal education as effectively as the Realists managed to
do.
This detour into what some of the group might call a portion of
the World-Historical Process now needs to be brought back to the
details that are, and have shaped, the Conference. The attack on
social science at the first meeting (and ever since) was so strong that
it brought an almost bitter, fifties-like denunciation from a soul as
calm as Marc Galanter, and a more resigned, "I think I am not
wanted here," from Joel Handler.4 9 The result has been that the so-
cial science post in the game of three-cornered catch has been weak,
personed primarily by David Trubek and Stewart Macaulay, the lat-
ter whose native Bah Humbugry makes him at best a fellow traveller.
Consequently, the stoutest defense of social science often comes from
the historians and others in the group interested in social and cul-
tural history. This assault on social science has also meant that the
rapprochement Trubek and Kennedy sought with the law and social
science group has been a conspicuous failure; in fact, the mandarins
of the Law and Society Association have responded with bitter de-
nunciations of the "new doctrinal barbarians." And this problem
has surely not been helped by Tushnet's wonderfully, or awfully
(take your pick), foul-tempered review of Lawrence Friedman's
Histoo 
5 0
On a more positive note, the quite tentative, very cliquish, even
conspiratorial, beginning of the Conference seems to have passed.
No more is one likely to find, as was the case at the first meeting,
Peter Gabel and Alan Freeman5" smoking big black cigars in one
secluded corner of David Trubek's yard, while Trubek and Roberto
Unger, seated in a peacock chair, in another secluded corner talked
South American politics, often in Spanish (or was it Portuguese?).
No more do strangers to the group, suffering from nothing more dan-
gerous than an understandable modicum of insecurity in new sur-
49. B. 1932. A.B. 1954, Princeton University; J.D. 1957, Harvard University. Assistant
Professor 1961-62, Vanderbilt University; Assistant Professor 1962-64, University of Illinois;
Professor 1965, University of Wisconsin.
50. Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's
".4 Histoy of American Law' 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81.
51. B. 1943. A.B. 1964, Brown University; LL.B 1967, New York University. Law
Clerk 1967-68, Judge Edward Weinfeld. Attorney-Adviser 1968-71, Office of General Coun-
sel, Department of the Air Force. Associate Professor 1971-74, Professor 1974, University of
Minnesota; Professor 1981, SUNY/Buffalo.
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roundings, seem to be "Stalinist" or "too intense." Instead, the
group has become incredibly friendly, even clubby. Thus, once the
perfectly silly embarrassment wears off about how little scholarship
the group as a whole, except for Tushnet, has produced in a year,
annual meetings become much like the gathering of a clan. And that
is good.
The aging of the group, with the accompanying proliferation of
children whose appearance at these meetings may signal, if ever so
softly, a possible hairline crack in the bourgeois separation of work
and family, of course adds to the clannishness. Thus, trading pic-
tures of one's children is by no means an unknown behavior, and a
threat to the tenure of, or a decline in the health of, a member is a
matter of more than a little seriousness. Similarly, the absence from
any gathering of, say, Alan Freeman, whose manic energy and relent-
less optimism has surely infected everyone, as well as nearly wiping
out his health, or Karl Klare,5 2 a wonderful combination of high seri-
ousness and warm, open goodwill, or Rand Rosenblatt, whose bald
Lenin-like profile -gives the impression of a fierceness that is simply
nowhere to be found in his humane inside, will not only be noted,
but actually counted against the success of the event.
But clannishness can have its downside, too. When missionaries
like Kennedy or Klare turn out hundreds of locals for a meeting of a
group whose core membership is no more than one hundred, the re-
sult is predictable. The old people, myself included, spend time
grumping about, wondering "Who are all these people," until finally
spotting a few old friends; then the hugs, kisses, and handshakes start.
Only thereafter, when such by no means insignificant formalities are
out of the way, can the serious business of the group, welcoming the
newcomers and introducing the members to them, both socially and
intellectually, begin in earnest.
Equally positive is the support the group has provided for young,
largely isolated, scholars scattered over the country in hostile
places. 53 Much of this support has come by providing protective col-
52. B. 1947. B.A. 1967, Columbia University; M.A. 1968, Yale University; J.D. 1975,
Harvard University. Staff Attorney 1975-76, National Labor Relations Board, Boston; pri-
vate practice 1976-77. Boston. Associate Professor 1977-80, Professor 1980, Northeastern
University.
53. I submit as evidence of the hostility of the liberal law school world a long discussion
I had with Alan Freeman about the first meeting of the Conference. As he experienced it, the
first issue on the table was liberal vs. radical; the second, empiricist vs. nonempiricist, and the
third, Critical Marxist vs. other Marxist. Given the nature of the invitations to that first
meeting, the first issue was decided before the doors were open and the last unavailable. That
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oration, by making left legal scholarship okay-weird but not dan-
gerous (or is it the other way around?). And in so doing, the group
has succeeded in what Trubek remembers as another of the Found-
ing Fathers' intentions. Less successful have been attempts to involve
practitioners who share a common politics in the organization. Some
came even after the second Madison conference, at which many felt
they were read out of the organization, but few, other than David
Kairys,54 who proves the rule by taking up legal scholarship, and
clinicians like Garry Bellow55 and Jeanne Charn, 56 have stayed. The
mismatch is obvious: Practice is only tangentially relevant to a
group largely engaged in dejustifying rules, for examining the law in
action is only a variation on the other CLS techniques for achieving
that end.
More encouraging is the recent explosive growth of a serious fem-
inist presence in the group. Its delayed appearance may have some-
thing to do with the late reception of women into the ranks of law
school teaching, an acceptance that today, even at the best of places,
tends to be partial, if not carefully monitored. But whatever the rea-
son, this presence, dominated as it is with a heavy legal rights analy-
sis and agenda, cannot but alter an organization that has until now
eschewed such an approach to law in favor of grander social theory
and explanation.
A good story has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Critical
Legal Baloney, as some of us fondly call it, has at best a beginning-
at Pasquina's Coffeehouse on Harvard Square, so I am told. Beyond
its beginning it has only people, people sharing a common politics
that convinces them that existing rules of law are not justifiable. If
the liberal conceit continues to unravel, and all concerned become
aware that the postulated dichotomy between the public sphere of
either issue was even seen as alive is a reflection of the battle back at Minnesota. Nor was this
misperception an isolated quirk of Alan's mind; others must have shared it with him. Tell-
ingly, those who correctly perceived the second issue as the only live one at that meeting came
from relatively less isolated environments-Buffalo or Wisconsin.
54. B. 1943. B.S. 1965, Cornell University; J.D. 1968, Columbia University; LL.M.
1971, University of Pennsylvania. Private practice 1971, Philadelphia.
55. B. 1935. B.A. 1957, Yale University, LL.B. 1960, Harvard University; LL.M. 1961,
Northwestern University. Director 1962-65, Legal Aid Agency for the District of Columbia.
Associate Professor 1968-71, University of Southern California; Visiting Professor 1971-72.
Professor 1972, Harvard University.
56. B. 1944. A.B. 1967, University of Michigan; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. Staff
Attorney 1970-71, Community Legal Assistance, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Assistant Dean
1973-77, Lecturer and Research Associate 1977-79, Harvard University. Director 1979, Le-
gal Services Institute, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts. Lecturer 1982, Harvard University.
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politics and the private sphere of law is fraudulent-that, in a
phrase, LAW IS POLITICS, pure and simple-then the movement
and its visible organ, the Conference, may be of some significance in
the world. If not, if it remains a group of individuals providing each
other with tremendous mutual support in a world seen to be basi-
cally hostile towards them, if it ends up only a "lonely hearts club for
left-wing law professors, '57 then it will still be important, maybe even
more so.
57. The phrase comes from Cappy Silver. B. 1955. A.B. 1978, Hampshire College. A
paralegal welfare advocate and antinuclear organizer who decided not to become a lawyer,
she is now an actress and singer with the progressive rock band, Balance of Power.
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